{"id":6904,"date":"2026-11-12T02:30:34","date_gmt":"2026-11-12T05:30:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tucumandevelopers.com\/index.php\/2026\/11\/12\/someone-is-sending-email-from-your-domain-how-to-stop-it-with-dmarc\/"},"modified":"2026-11-12T02:30:34","modified_gmt":"2026-11-12T05:30:34","slug":"someone-is-sending-email-from-your-domain-how-to-stop-it-with-dmarc","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tucumandevelopers.com\/index.php\/2026\/11\/12\/someone-is-sending-email-from-your-domain-how-to-stop-it-with-dmarc\/","title":{"rendered":"Someone is sending email from your domain: how to stop it with DMARC"},"content":{"rendered":"<div>\n<div><\/div>\n<p>That is documented output from learn.microsoft.com, not output from your tenant. Read it like this: <code>header.from=contoso.com<\/code> is the forged domain, while <code>smtp.mailfrom<\/code> and <code>header.d<\/code> belong to a different domain, so <code>dmarc=fail<\/code>.<\/p>\n<p>Use the result to decide what you are dealing with:<\/p>\n<div>\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>What the header shows<\/th>\n<th>Most likely cause<\/th>\n<th>Next step<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td> <code>dmarc=fail<\/code>, <code>smtp.mailfrom<\/code> and <code>header.d<\/code> in someone else&#8217;s domain<\/td>\n<td>Spoofing from outside<\/td>\n<td>Continue with steps 2 to 6<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>SPF or DKIM passes and the domain is yours (for example <code>header.d=contoso.com<\/code>, <code>dmarc=pass<\/code>)<\/td>\n<td>Mail left a system you authorize: a compromised mailbox, a stolen app credential or a forgotten sender<\/td>\n<td>Treat as an account incident: reset passwords, enforce MFA, review the sending system<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td> <code>dmarc=bestguesspass<\/code> or <code>dmarc=none<\/code> <\/td>\n<td>You have no DMARC record at all<\/td>\n<td>Publish one in step 3<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td> <code>spf=fail<\/code> with <code>-all<\/code>, but the message was still delivered<\/td>\n<td>The receiver doesn&#8217;t enforce, or DMARC isn&#8217;t set<\/td>\n<td>Publish DMARC; enforcement depends on the receiver<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p>The second row is an inference from how alignment works rather than a rule Microsoft states in one sentence: a message aligned with your domain by SPF or DKIM can only have been sent by a source that SPF authorizes or that holds your DKIM key. If that describes your spam, tighten account security first. The <a href=\"https:\/\/www.epifive.com\/blog\/small-business-mfa-rollout-staff-checklist\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">small business MFA rollout checklist<\/a> covers that side.<\/p>\n<h2> <a name=\"step-2-check-what-your-domain-publishes-today\" href=\"#step-2-check-what-your-domain-publishes-today\"> <\/a> Step 2: Check what your domain publishes today <\/h2>\n<p>Before you change records, look at what exists. In PowerShell, <code>Resolve-DnsName<\/code> (also used in Microsoft&#8217;s own troubleshooting page) shows the DMARC record: <\/p>\n<div>\n<pre><code><span>Resolve<\/span><span>-<\/span><span>DnsName<\/span> <span>-<\/span><span>Name<\/span> <span>\"_dmarc.contoso.com\"<\/span> <span>-<\/span><span>Type<\/span> <span>TXT<\/span> <span>|<\/span> <span>Select<\/span><span>-<\/span><span>Object<\/span> <span>-<\/span><span>ExpandProperty<\/span> <span>Strings<\/span> <\/code><\/pre>\n<div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<p>Check the SPF record the same way, against the domain itself: <\/p>\n<div>\n<pre><code><span>Resolve<\/span><span>-<\/span><span>DnsName<\/span> <span>-<\/span><span>Name<\/span> <span>\"contoso.com\"<\/span> <span>-<\/span><span>Type<\/span> <span>TXT<\/span> <span>|<\/span> <span>Select<\/span><span>-<\/span><span>Object<\/span> <span>-<\/span><span>ExpandProperty<\/span> <span>Strings<\/span> <\/code><\/pre>\n<div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<p>You are looking for three things. A single record starting <code>v=spf1<\/code>, because two SPF records cause <code>permerror<\/code>. A <code>_dmarc<\/code> TXT record starting <code>v=DMARC1;<\/code>, and its <code>p=<\/code> value. And whether the SPF record ends in <code>-all<\/code>. If no <code>_dmarc<\/code> record exists, Microsoft 365 reports <code>dmarc=bestguesspass<\/code> or <code>dmarc=none<\/code> for your mail when it receives it, and nobody is told to reject forgeries.<\/p>\n<p>If you use Microsoft 365, you can also check DKIM: <\/p>\n<div>\n<pre><code><span>Get<\/span><span>-<\/span><span>DkimSigningConfig<\/span> <span>|<\/span> <span>Format<\/span><span>-<\/span><span>List<\/span> <span>Domain<\/span><span>,<\/span> <span>Enabled<\/span><span>,<\/span> <span>Selector1CNAME<\/span><span>,<\/span> <span>Selector2CNAME<\/span> <\/code><\/pre>\n<div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<p><code>Enabled<\/code> should be <code>True<\/code> for your custom domain. The full procedure for publishing the CNAME records and enabling signing is in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.epifive.com\/blog\/spf-dkim-dmarc-microsoft-365-setup\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">SPF, DKIM and DMARC for Microsoft 365<\/a>, so this article doesn&#8217;t repeat it.<\/p>\n<h2> <a name=\"step-3-publish-dmarc-at-pnone-with-reporting\" href=\"#step-3-publish-dmarc-at-pnone-with-reporting\"> <\/a> Step 3: Publish DMARC at p=none with reporting <\/h2>\n<p>Don&#8217;t jump to <code>p=reject<\/code> yet. If a legitimate sender such as a billing tool or newsletter service isn&#8217;t aligned, <code>p=reject<\/code> makes receivers refuse your real mail. Start with monitoring, which also gives you evidence of how much forged mail exists.<\/p>\n<p>First create a place for reports. Microsoft recommends a dedicated mailbox or a Microsoft 365 Group, not a person&#8217;s inbox, and says to start with <code>rua<\/code> only because forensic (<code>ruf<\/code>) reports can be high volume. Then add one TXT record at your DNS host: <\/p>\n<div>\n<pre><code>Hostname: _dmarc Type: TXT Value: v=DMARC1; p=none; pct=100; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@contoso.com <\/code><\/pre>\n<div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<p>Microsoft&#8217;s rollout example uses the same structure, with <code>rua<\/code> and <code>ruf<\/code> addresses. A few details from the documentation:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The hostname <code>_dmarc<\/code> is required, and there must be only one <code>_dmarc<\/code> TXT record.<\/li>\n<li> <code>p=none<\/code> takes no action on failing mail but still produces reports.<\/li>\n<li> <code>pct<\/code> defaults to 100 if you leave it out.<\/li>\n<li>Aggregate reports are typically sent once a day and describe the previous day.<\/li>\n<li>If the report address is in a different domain from the one you&#8217;re monitoring, that other domain must publish a TXT record named <code>contoso.com._report._dmarc<\/code> with the value <code>v=DMARC1;<\/code>. Without it receivers don&#8217;t deliver the reports.<\/li>\n<li>Microsoft 365 doesn&#8217;t send forensic reports even if your record has a <code>ruf<\/code> address, so other providers&#8217; reports are the only source.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The reports are XML, often compressed. You can read them by hand while the volume is small, or use a DMARC reporting service listed in the Microsoft Intelligent Security Association catalog.<\/p>\n<h2> <a name=\"step-4-read-the-aggregate-reports\" href=\"#step-4-read-the-aggregate-reports\"> <\/a> Step 4: Read the aggregate reports <\/h2>\n<p>Give the record at least a few days so that receivers send their summaries. Then look at each <code>&lt;record&gt;<\/code> in the XML. Microsoft&#8217;s page explains the fields that matter:<\/p>\n<div>\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Element<\/th>\n<th>What it tells you<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><code>&lt;source_ip&gt;<\/code><\/td>\n<td>The server that sent mail using your domain<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><code>&lt;count&gt;<\/code><\/td>\n<td>How many messages came from that IP<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><code>&lt;disposition&gt;<\/code><\/td>\n<td>What the receiver did: <code>none<\/code>, <code>quarantine<\/code> or <code>reject<\/code> <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td> <code>&lt;dkim&gt;<\/code> and <code>&lt;spf&gt;<\/code> under <code>&lt;policy_evaluated&gt;<\/code> <\/td>\n<td>Whether DKIM or SPF <strong>aligned<\/strong> with your From domain<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td> <code>&lt;domain&gt;<\/code> under <code>&lt;auth_results&gt;<\/code> <\/td>\n<td>The domain SPF or DKIM actually validated<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p>Sort the sources into three groups:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li> <strong>Known and aligned.<\/strong> Your Microsoft 365 tenant, with SPF aligned. Healthy; no action.<\/li>\n<li> <strong>Known but not aligned.<\/strong> A legitimate service where authentication passes but alignment fails. The page&#8217;s example: SPF <code>pass<\/code> in <code>auth_results<\/code> but <code>fail<\/code> in <code>policy_evaluated<\/code>. The service uses its own domain in MAIL FROM or signs with its own domain. Fix it at the service: have it sign DKIM with your domain, or change its MAIL FROM to your domain or a subdomain.<\/li>\n<li> <strong>Unknown, high volume, everything failing.<\/strong> Microsoft&#8217;s table describes this pattern as a potential spoofing or phishing campaign and says no action is needed because your DMARC policy protects recipients once it is enforced. This is the group you are trying to stop.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>Don&#8217;t skip group 2. Every legitimate sender you leave unaligned becomes a bounce the day you reach <code>p=reject<\/code>. Common examples named in Microsoft&#8217;s table are services that use their own MAIL FROM, forwarded mail and mailing lists. Forwarding is the exception: it breaks SPF and can break DKIM when the body changes, so a share of failures from forwarders is normal.<\/p>\n<h2> <a name=\"step-5-fix-spf-and-dkim-for-the-legitimate-senders\" href=\"#step-5-fix-spf-and-dkim-for-the-legitimate-senders\"> <\/a> Step 5: Fix SPF and DKIM for the legitimate senders <\/h2>\n<p>For each legitimate sender from group 2, use the vendor&#8217;s documentation to find its <code>include:<\/code> value or its DKIM setup. For Microsoft 365 as the only sender, Microsoft&#8217;s documented SPF record is: <\/p>\n<div>\n<pre><code>v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all <\/code><\/pre>\n<div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<p>For a domain with an on-premises server and a bulk mailer on a subdomain, the same page gives: <\/p>\n<div>\n<pre><code>contoso.com TXT v=spf1 ip4:192.168.0.10 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all marketing.contoso.com TXT v=spf1 include:servers.adatum.com include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all <\/code><\/pre>\n<div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<p>Keep these rules in mind:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>One SPF record per domain or subdomain.<\/li>\n<li>Fewer than 10 DNS lookups. <code>include<\/code>, <code>a<\/code>, <code>mx<\/code>, <code>exists<\/code> and <code>redirect<\/code> each count, and so do nested includes; <code>ip4<\/code>, <code>ip6<\/code> and <code>all<\/code> don&#8217;t. If you exceed the limit, see <a href=\"https:\/\/www.epifive.com\/blog\/spf-record-too-long-10-lookup-limit\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">fixing an SPF record that is too long<\/a>.<\/li>\n<li>Use <code>-all<\/code>. Microsoft notes that DMARC treats <code>-all<\/code> and <code>~all<\/code> both as SPF failures, but a <code>~all<\/code> failure is effectively ignored by DMARC when the message has no DKIM signature.<\/li>\n<li>Put services you don&#8217;t control, such as bulk mail platforms, on a subdomain. Each subdomain needs its own SPF record and DKIM setup, because unlike DMARC they don&#8217;t inherit from the parent.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>After each change, watch the next day&#8217;s reports and confirm that the sender moved from group 2 to group 1.<\/p>\n<h2> <a name=\"step-6-move-to-quarantine-then-reject\" href=\"#step-6-move-to-quarantine-then-reject\"> <\/a> Step 6: Move to quarantine, then reject <\/h2>\n<p>Once the legitimate senders are aligned and the only failing traffic is unknown sources, tighten the policy in stages. Microsoft&#8217;s recommended order is <code>p=none<\/code>, then <code>p=quarantine<\/code>, then <code>p=reject<\/code>, starting with a subdomain that has low mail volume and saving the parent domain for last. You can step <code>pct<\/code> through 10, 25, 50, 75 and 100 to limit the share of failing mail that gets the policy at first. <\/p>\n<div>\n<pre><code>Hostname: _dmarc Type: TXT Value: v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=25; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@contoso.com <\/code><\/pre>\n<div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<p>When the reports stay clean at 100, finish with: <\/p>\n<div>\n<pre><code>Hostname: _dmarc Type: TXT Value: v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@contoso.com <\/code><\/pre>\n<div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<p>What &#8220;reject&#8221; means depends on the receiver. Microsoft&#8217;s page says the messages are typically discarded, and that a Microsoft 365 recipient with <strong>Honor DMARC record policy<\/strong> turned on rejects a failing message during SMTP with <code>550 5.7.1<\/code> and stamps <code>dmarc=fail action=oreject<\/code>. With <code>p=quarantine<\/code>, the message goes to Junk Email by default. Other providers make their own decisions, which is why DMARC lowers the volume of spoofing instead of removing it.<\/p>\n<p>One side effect to know about: outbound mail from a Microsoft 365 domain that fails DMARC at the destination is routed through the high-risk delivery pool if your policy is <code>p=quarantine<\/code> or <code>p=reject<\/code>, and there is no override. Align your senders first, so that doesn&#8217;t catch legitimate mail.<\/p>\n<h2> <a name=\"step-7-lock-down-domains-and-subdomains-that-dont-send-mail\" href=\"#step-7-lock-down-domains-and-subdomains-that-dont-send-mail\"> <\/a> Step 7: Lock down domains and subdomains that don&#8217;t send mail <\/h2>\n<p>Attackers don&#8217;t need your main domain. Old domains, typo-protection domains and unused subdomains are all usable for forgeries if nothing is published. For a registered domain that sends no mail, Microsoft documents two records: <\/p>\n<div>\n<pre><code>Hostname: @ (contoso.net) Type: TXT Value: v=spf1 -all Hostname: _dmarc (contoso.net) Type: TXT Value: v=DMARC1; p=reject; <\/code><\/pre>\n<div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<p>The <code>pct<\/code>, <code>rua<\/code> and <code>ruf<\/code> values are arguably unnecessary here because no valid mail should come from the domain. Microsoft&#8217;s note also applies to your <code>*.onmicrosoft.com<\/code> domain: if you don&#8217;t use it for email, add a DMARC record for it, which you do in the Microsoft 365 admin center under <strong>Settings<\/strong> &gt; <strong>Domains<\/strong>, then the <strong>DNS records<\/strong> tab and <strong>Add record<\/strong>, with the TXT name <code>_dmarc<\/code> and the value <code>v=DMARC1; p=reject<\/code>. DMARC on your main domain also covers subdomains that have no record of their own, including ones that don&#8217;t exist, unless a subdomain publishes its own <code>_dmarc<\/code> record.<\/p>\n<h2> <a name=\"troubleshooting\" href=\"#troubleshooting\"> <\/a> Troubleshooting <\/h2>\n<div>\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Symptom<\/th>\n<th>Likely cause<\/th>\n<th>Fix<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td> <code>dmarc=fail<\/code> but SPF and DKIM both pass<\/td>\n<td>Neither domain aligns with the From address<\/td>\n<td>Make the service sign with your domain or use your domain in MAIL FROM<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td> <code>dmarc=temperror<\/code> or <code>dmarc=permerror<\/code> <\/td>\n<td>DNS timeout, or a DMARC record with a syntax error<\/td>\n<td>Check syntax with <code>Resolve-DnsName<\/code>, and keep exactly one <code>_dmarc<\/code> TXT record<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>No reports arrive<\/td>\n<td>Wrong <code>rua<\/code> address, or external report address without the <code>_report._dmarc<\/code> record<\/td>\n<td>Fix the address or publish <code>contoso.com._report._dmarc<\/code> in the receiving domain<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Legitimate mail from a vendor is rejected after <code>p=reject<\/code> <\/td>\n<td>The vendor isn&#8217;t aligned<\/td>\n<td>Add its DKIM signing with your domain; move it to a subdomain<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Forwarded messages fail<\/td>\n<td>Forwarding breaks SPF; body changes can break DKIM<\/td>\n<td>Expect some failures; the receiving side can use trusted ARC sealers<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>You still see forged mail in some inboxes<\/td>\n<td>The receiving provider doesn&#8217;t enforce DMARC, or you&#8217;re still at <code>p=none<\/code> <\/td>\n<td>Confirm the published policy; enforcement is the receiver&#8217;s decision<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p>If the spoofed mail targets your own users, a Microsoft 365 tenant can also deal with inbound forgeries of your domain. The <a href=\"https:\/\/www.epifive.com\/blog\/tenant-allow-block-list-spoofed-senders\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Tenant Allow\/Block List guide<\/a> explains the spoofed sender entries, and Microsoft documents the anti-phishing setting <strong>Honor DMARC record policy when the message is detected as spoof<\/strong>.<\/p>\n<h2> <a name=\"what-to-do-while-you-wait\" href=\"#what-to-do-while-you-wait\"> <\/a> What to do while you wait <\/h2>\n<p>DNS changes and receivers&#8217; enforcement take time, and DMARC doesn&#8217;t recall mail that was already sent. In the meantime:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Tell customers and staff that you will never change bank details by email, and agree how payment changes are verified, for example by calling a known number.<\/li>\n<li>Report the phishing to the people it targeted, so they can block it on their side.<\/li>\n<li>Keep the sample headers and message copies so you can show which domain and IP the mail came from.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2> <a name=\"checklist\" href=\"#checklist\"> <\/a> Checklist <\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li>Read the <code>Authentication-Results<\/code> header of a sample message and decide spoofing or compromised account.<\/li>\n<li>Check that exactly one SPF record and a <code>_dmarc<\/code> record exist.<\/li>\n<li>Publish <code>v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=...<\/code> and confirm reports arrive.<\/li>\n<li>Sort the aggregate report sources and align every legitimate sender.<\/li>\n<li>Move to <code>p=quarantine<\/code>, then <code>p=reject<\/code>, using <code>pct<\/code> steps, subdomains first.<\/li>\n<li>Publish <code>v=spf1 -all<\/code> and <code>p=reject<\/code> for parked domains.<\/li>\n<li>Review reports weekly at first and monthly once stable.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2> <a name=\"what-we-checked\" href=\"#what-we-checked\"> <\/a> What we checked <\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li>Opened &#8220;Set up DMARC to validate email in Microsoft 365&#8221; on learn.microsoft.com on 2026-11-12 (page dated 2026-07-03): the record syntax, <code>p=none<\/code>\/<code>quarantine<\/code>\/<code>reject<\/code> rollout order, the <code>pct<\/code> steps 10, 25, 50, 75 and 100, and the parked-domain record <code>v=DMARC1; p=reject;<\/code>.<\/li>\n<li>Opened the SPF configuration page on 2026-11-12 and confirmed the Microsoft 365 record <code>v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all<\/code>, the parked-domain record <code>v=spf1 -all<\/code>, and the 10-lookup rules.<\/li>\n<li>Cross-checked the <code>Authentication-Results<\/code> fields (<code>smtp.mailfrom<\/code>, <code>header.d<\/code>, <code>header.from<\/code>, <code>dmarc<\/code>, <code>action<\/code>) between the DMARC page and the &#8220;Anti-spam message headers&#8221; page; both describe <code>dmarc=fail action=oreject<\/code> the same way.<\/li>\n<li>Documented output: the sample <code>Authentication-Results<\/code> header in step 1 is quoted from Microsoft&#8217;s DMARC troubleshooting section, with <code>compauth=fail reason=000<\/code>. The reason code table on the headers page defines 000 as a DMARC fail where the sender&#8217;s policy is <code>p=quarantine<\/code> or <code>p=reject<\/code>.<\/li>\n<li>Confirmed on the DMARC page that Microsoft 365 doesn&#8217;t send forensic reports and that cross-domain report addresses need a <code>_report._dmarc<\/code> TXT record.<\/li>\n<li>Not checked hands-on: we did not run any command or change DNS on a live tenant or domain, and the second row of the step 1 table is our own reading of how alignment works. Steps follow Microsoft&#8217;s documentation as of 2026-11-12.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Last tested: 2026-11-12<\/p>\n<h2> <a name=\"references\" href=\"#references\"> <\/a> References <\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li>Set up DMARC to validate email in Microsoft 365: <a href=\"https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/en-us\/defender-office-365\/email-authentication-dmarc-configure\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/en-us\/defender-office-365\/email-authentication-dmarc-configure<\/a> <\/li>\n<li>Set up SPF to identify valid email sources: <a href=\"https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/en-us\/defender-office-365\/email-authentication-spf-configure\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/en-us\/defender-office-365\/email-authentication-spf-configure<\/a> <\/li>\n<li>How email authentication works in Microsoft 365: <a href=\"https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/en-us\/defender-office-365\/email-authentication-about\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/en-us\/defender-office-365\/email-authentication-about<\/a> <\/li>\n<li>Anti-spam message headers (Authentication-Results and compauth reason codes): <a href=\"https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/en-us\/defender-office-365\/message-headers-eop-mdo\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/en-us\/defender-office-365\/message-headers-eop-mdo<\/a> <\/li>\n<li>View internet message headers in Outlook: <a href=\"https:\/\/support.microsoft.com\/office\/cd039382-dc6e-4264-ac74-c048563d212c\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">https:\/\/support.microsoft.com\/office\/cd039382-dc6e-4264-ac74-c048563d212c<\/a> <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<hr>\n<p><em>This guide was researched and drafted with AI assistance and checked against the vendor documentation listed in its References. Read the maintained version and related guides on <a href=\"https:\/\/www.epifive.com\/blog\/someone-sending-emails-from-my-domain-stop-spoofing-dmarc\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">EpiFive<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<p>Fuente: <a href=\"https:\/\/dev.to\/epifive\/someone-is-sending-email-from-your-domain-how-to-stop-it-with-dmarc-3jib\">Art\u00edculo original<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>That is documented output from learn.microsoft.com, not output from your tenant. Read it like this: header.from=contoso.com is the forged domain, while smtp.mailfrom and header.d belong to a different domain, so dmarc=fail. Use the result to decide what you are dealing with: What the header shows Most likely cause Next step dmarc=fail, smtp.mailfrom and header.d in [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":6903,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2},"webixso_pending_account_ids":""},"categories":[41],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6904","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-devto"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/tucumandevelopers.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6904","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/tucumandevelopers.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/tucumandevelopers.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tucumandevelopers.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tucumandevelopers.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6904"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/tucumandevelopers.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6904\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tucumandevelopers.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6903"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/tucumandevelopers.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6904"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tucumandevelopers.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6904"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tucumandevelopers.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6904"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}