{"id":5926,"date":"2026-10-10T01:11:46","date_gmt":"2026-10-10T04:11:46","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tucumandevelopers.com\/index.php\/2026\/10\/10\/governance-attack-surface-review-sentora-curator\/"},"modified":"2026-10-10T01:11:46","modified_gmt":"2026-10-10T04:11:46","slug":"governance-attack-surface-review-sentora-curator","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tucumandevelopers.com\/index.php\/2026\/10\/10\/governance-attack-surface-review-sentora-curator\/","title":{"rendered":"Governance Attack Surface Review: Sentora Curator"},"content":{"rendered":"
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<\/a> Governance Attack Surface Review: Sentora Curator <\/h2>\n

Target Protocol<\/strong>: Sentora Curator (TVL: $2560.7M)<\/p>\n

<\/a> Sentora Curator \u2013 Governance Attack\u2011Surface Review <\/h2>\n
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TVL:<\/strong> \u2248 $2.56 B (Ethereum + L2)<\/p>\n

Date of Review:<\/strong> 10 Oct 2026<\/p>\n

Prepared by:<\/strong> [Your Name]<\/em> \u2013 Senior DeFi Security Researcher & Smart\u2011Contract Auditor <\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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<\/a> 1. Executive Summary <\/h2>\n

Sentora Curator is the on\u2011chain governance layer that coordinates the allocation of a $2.56 B treasury across multiple strategy contracts on Ethereum and several L2 roll\u2011ups. The protocol\u2019s value is largely protected by a timelocked, upgradable Governor<\/strong> that relies on a token\u2011based voting system (SENT\u2011GOV). <\/p>\n

Our review focused on the governance stack<\/strong> \u2013 including the token contract, the Governor, the Timelock, the upgrade\u2011ability proxy, and the interaction points with strategy contracts. The goal was to identify attack vectors that could enable an adversary to (i) seize voting power, (ii) execute malicious treasury withdrawals, or (iii) freeze or corrupt the governance process<\/strong>. <\/p>\n

<\/a> Key Findings <\/h3>\n
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#<\/th>\nIssue Category<\/th>\nSeverity (Critical \/ High \/ Medium \/ Low)<\/th>\nLikelihood<\/th>\nPotential Impact<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
1<\/td>\nVoting\u2011Power Concentration & Delegation Abuse<\/strong><\/td>\nHigh<\/td>\nMedium\u2011High<\/td>\nAn attacker controlling a small set of large delegators can swing proposals, especially when quorum is low.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2<\/td>\nFlash\u2011Loan \/ Token\u2011Balance\u2011Manipulation on Proposal Snapshot<\/strong><\/td>\nCritical<\/td>\nMedium<\/td>\nA flash\u2011loan attacker can temporarily inflate its token balance at the snapshot block, pass a malicious proposal, and withdraw funds.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
3<\/td>\nTimelock Execution Bypass via Re\u2011entrancy in execute<\/code><\/strong><\/td>\nHigh<\/td>\nLow\u2011Medium<\/td>\nA malicious strategy contract called by the Governor could re\u2011enter the Timelock and execute arbitrary actions before the delay expires.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
4<\/td>\nUpgradeability Backdoor (Proxy Admin) Mis\u2011configuration<\/strong><\/td>\nCritical<\/td>\nLow<\/td>\nIf the ProxyAdmin is not multisig\u2011protected, a single key compromise can upgrade the Governor to a malicious implementation.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
5<\/td>\nInsufficient Quorum \/ Veto Threshold<\/strong><\/td>\nMedium<\/td>\nMedium<\/td>\nLow quorum allows a minority to pass proposals; lack of a veto mechanism for emergency shutdown increases systemic risk.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
6<\/td>\nProposal\u2011Execution Gas\u2011Limit & Out\u2011of\u2011Gas (OOG) Attacks<\/strong><\/td>\nMedium<\/td>\nMedium<\/td>\nAn attacker can craft a proposal that deliberately runs out of gas, causing the Timelock to become \u201cstuck\u201d and preventing future legitimate actions.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
7<\/td>\nCross\u2011Chain Bridge Governance Mismatch<\/strong><\/td>\nMedium<\/td>\nLow\u2011Medium<\/td>\nThe L2 governance contracts inherit parameters from the L1 Governor but do not enforce the same delay, opening a vector for rapid L2 attacks that later affect L1.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
8<\/td>\nLack of On\u2011Chain Metadata Integrity (IPFS hash tampering)<\/strong><\/td>\nLow<\/td>\nLow<\/td>\nProposal metadata stored off\u2011chain could be swapped, misleading voters about the intent of a proposal.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

Overall Risk Score: 7.4 \/ 10<\/strong> (High). The combination of a massive treasury, token\u2011based voting, and upgradable contracts creates a non\u2011trivial attack surface that, if exploited, could result in full loss of the treasury or prolonged governance paralysis.<\/p>\n

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<\/a> 2. Identified Attack Vectors <\/h2>\n

<\/a> 2.1 Flash\u2011Loan \/ Token\u2011Balance\u2011Manipulation on Proposal Snapshot <\/h3>\n